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Abstract: TEN-T is intended to provide the single market with 
integrated modern transport networks, but infrastructure 
investment per se has other important effects. Besides reviewing 
the different reasons that justify public investment in 
infrastructure capital, the paper focuses the existing obstacles 
to a full implementation of TEN-T and, in particular, the 
funding gap, which has always been the most evident obstacle 
of them. Prospects and possible remedies are also briefly 
considered.  
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1. Introduction 
It is also in the quality and extension of  networked transport 
infrastructures, although not only in this, that the character of a State can be 
assessed. With the single market in existence and the single currency in 
circulation, the progress made by the EU and its Member States in transport 
networks appears limited if the results are compared with the original 
ambitions and programs. It is, therefore, worth asking what the problems and 
the perspectives are of TEN-T, i.e. the core Trans European Transport 
Network. Section 2 provides a short overview of its main steps and 
achievements. The paper then focuses the funding gap, i.e. the most evident 
TEN-T problem (Section 3), the differences between infrastructure capital 
and public investment and their relations with economic growth (Section 4) 
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and the funding implications of long-term real interest rates (Section 5). The 
profitability issue (Section 6) and the budgeting issue of infrastructure 
investment (Section 7) are also considered. Section 8 is dedicated to the 
governance aspects with special reference to the Italian case. Section 9 
briefly concludes.  
 
2. Pan-European Corridors, TENs, TEN-T 
Pan-European transport corridors are new modern routes in Central and 
Eastern Europe envisaged to speed up integration in the European 
Community, which in the early 1990s was already set to enlarge. The 
European Transport Network (TENT-T) was planned as part of the Trans 
European Networks (TENs), i.e. the infrastructure policy embedded in the 
Maastricht Treaty (1992). In both cases the aim basically was to allow goods 
and people to circulate quickly and easily across borders, and the realization 
of a single, multimodal network, in particular, was intended to parallel the 
completion of the single market and the start of the process expected to lead 
to the launch of the single currency.  
The TEN-T network was planned to comprise traditional infrastructure and 
equipment as well as innovative management transport systems. In 
December 1993 the European Council established a group of representatives 
chaired by the Commission Vice-President H. Cristophersen to identify a 
limited number of concrete projects of major importance for the EU-12. The 
selected 14 projects were chosen on the basis of relevance and a number of 
other criteria, but even then the available financial resources appeared 
limited. In 1994, after the completion of the internal market, at the start of 
Stage 2 of the convergence process to the euro and the then foreseen 
acceleration in the enlargement process in the east, the ten Pan-European 
Corridors and the TEN-T network coalesced into a single large program of 
infrastructure building. In 2004, i.e. just after the accession of ten new 
member countries, the list of priority projects was extended to 30  in order to 
take into account two further new entrants to what is now known as the EU-
27. The series of 30 axes had already been identified in late 2004 on the 
basis of proposals from the Member States and was devised by concentrating 
on major projects capable of completing those implemented at national level.  
Indeed, the network was intended to deepen European integration and 
completion was planned for 2020.  
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Ten years later, L. Barrot, Vice-President of the EC with responsibility for 
transport in the EU-25 (Barrot, 2005) unambiguously remarked that the 
results had fallen short of the original ambitions largely because the amount 
of resources required was huge. Indeed, a true trans-European network for 
the then still enlarging EU-25 had been estimated to amount to €900bn over 
the period 1996-2020 (EC-DG TREN, 2010). The 30 TEN-T priority 
projects form the first layer of the European network of rail, road, internal 
waterways and sea waterway axes.  The estimated cost was €415bn. The 
priority projects basically pursue interconnection between national networks 
since road, rail and air traffic management systems or horizontal projects 
were added. The second layer is the comprehensive network which is formed 
by existing rail, road, water links and nodes. New links or the upgrading of 
existing links are expected to cost more than €500bn and consist of 
thousands of kilometers of conventional railways and particularly HSR†. 
While Priority Projects can benefit from Community resources and 
coordination, the completion of the comprehensive layer rests almost 
entirely with the Member States both financially and in terms of 
coordination. Each priority project is eligible to receive EU grants from only 
one source chosen among the TEN-T Programme, Cohesion funds, ERDF 
and the Research Framework Programme. Priority projects are co-financed 
and may benefit from loans and guarantees from the European Investment 
Bank. 
The resources available under the 2000-2006 financial perspective were 
largely insufficient to match such efforts and in 2005, the EC appointed six 
coordinators to promote a coherent framework and to look for financing 
schemes alternative to those found in the EU and the national budgets. In 
2006, the EU further established the Trans-European Transport Network 
Agency (TEN-T EA)‡ to manage the Community action in the Priority 
Projects. For these projects, the TEN-T EA executive agency has now 
obtained full responsibility for the management and monitoring of projects. 
                                                           
†
 An HSR network is supposed to be formed by links of 300km minimum for trains 
running at 250km/h at least. 
‡
 The TEN-T maps are downloadable from: http://tentea.ec.europa.eu/en/ten-
t_projects/, or: http://ec.europa.eu/transport/infrastructure/maps/maps_en.htm 
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With the current financial perspective 2007-2013, the EU has made a 
strategic choice based on the concentration of its infrastructure investments  
in the Priority Projects and in particular as regards cross-border sections, 
bottlenecks and access routes. The resources for the TEN-T provided by the 
EU amount to little more than €8bn, 80-85% of which are available for the 
30 Priority Projects and for the horizontal priorities. These resources are 
intended to lever on national public funding and on private funding as well. 
The next financial perspective (2014-2021) is expected to change the current 
dual-layer strategy into one formed by a priority network − largely HSR − 
and a “conceptual pillar” to help integrate the various transport policies and 
infrastructure, i.e. something very difficult to figure out in practical terms 
(EC, 2009).   
3. A funding gap 
The internal market was thought from the start to be in need of 
modernization in basically all networks, from transport and energy to 
communication, but the EU and the European national governments faced 
and continue to face the problem of finding adequate financial resources to 
make the estimated infrastructure investments. The divergence between the 
need for infrastructure investments and available funds in the old Member 
Countries, i.e. the funding gap, was evident from the early Nineties, but it 
has widened over the years since EU enlargement has compounded the 
effects of deepening internal integration on the demand for infrastructure 
capital. On one side, it was thought that the fast-enlarging internal market 
needed more infrastructure capital to work properly and deliver; on the 
other, available funding has not grown at the same rate. This can be seen 
from the figures for the comprehensive network reported in Table 1. The 
effect of enlargement can be seen in the first section of the Table, which 
shows that the average annual cost in the TEN-T comprehensive network in 
the EU-27 (from the 1996-1999 to the current 2007-2013 financial 
perspective) increased by 263%; while it decreased to 71% in the old EU-15 
Member Countries. As regards the financial sources, it can be noted that 
over the three financial perspectives, the funds provided by the Cohesion 
Fund rose by 302% and those in the TENT-T Programme increased by 
257%. The funds for regional development (ERDF) actually decreased to 
89%. The nature of the resources is dealt with in the last section of Table 1. 
Grants made available by the EU increased by 206%, i.e. more than those in 
the loans offered by BIS (169%). In sum, financial resources contributed by 
the EU rose by 169% only, i.e. less than the total cost of the comprehensive 
TEN-T network (263%).  
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Table 1 - TENT-T Comprehensive Network  Costs  (€bn)  
(Annual average per financial perspective and 
ratio)   
  
A 
1996-
1999 
B 
2000-
2006 
C 
2007-
2013 Ratio C/A 
TEN-T old Member Countries  63,6 39,29 45,43 0,71 
TEN-T comprehensive network 21,2 43,14 55,71 2,63 
Programme TEN-T 0,446 0,63 1,14 2,57 
Cohesion Fund 1,646 2,36 4,97 3,02 
European Regional Dev. Fund 1,502 1,23 1,34 0,89 
European Investment Bank 5,3 5,91 7,57 1,43 
Total Community contribution 8,894 10,13 15,03 1,69 
Grants 3,612 4,22 7,46 2,06 
Grants and loans 8,912 10,13 15,03 1,69 
 Own elaborations on EC-DG TREN (2010) data source  
 
The current contraction in public funding in national projects clearly 
reflects the need for consolidation in public finances at the national level. 
This need was already obvious in the early Nineties, but it definitely 
accelerated in 2010, when the global financial crisis turned into the euro 
crisis. The limited investment made by the private sector in infrastructure 
reflects the fact that investment in non-transport infrastructure, such as 
rolling stock and other mobile goods, is held to be more profitable than that 
in infrastructure. Accordingly, public investment, which is essential in 
infrastructure investment, remained scarce while private investment, which, 
although present in infrastructure investment (such as motorways and 
airports), has continued to prefer non-infrastructure investment. This is far 
from being a European specificity. Indeed, only a small part of global long-
term investment is devoted to infrastructure investment (Monti, 2010).  
Table 2 provides a basis for a discussion of the trend in the annual average 
cost in the 30 Priority Projects and across the last three financial 
perspectives. The available estimate shows that the average annual cost 
increased by 472% over the years. The annual average amount of EU 
resources and their nature are also displayed in Table 2. Only the resources 
available under the TEN-T Programme have grown slightly in a comparable 
way to costs (i.e. 400% vis-à-vis 472%). The Community contribution has 
neither increased cohesion funds sufficiently (321%) nor those of regional 
development funds (ERDF) (322%). Financing from the EIB grew even less 
(256%).      
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Table 2 - TENT-T Priority Projects Costs  (€bn)  
(Annual average per financial perspective and ratio) 
  
A 
1996-
1999 
B 
2000-
2006 
C 
2007-
2013 
Ratio 
C/A 
TEN-T Priority Projects 6,53 18,74 30,8 4,72 
Programme TEN-T 0,27 0,56 1,08 4,00 
Cohesion Fund 0,766 1,4 2,46 3,21 
European Regional Dev. Fund 0,292 0,962 0,94 3,22 
European Investment Bank 1,956 3,22 5 2,56 
Total Community contribution 3,284 6,142 9,48 2,89 
Grants 1,328 2,922 4,48 3,37 
Grants and loans 3,284 6,142 9,48 2,89 
 Own elaborations on EC-DG TREN (2010) data source  
 
By 2004, the comprehensive network was estimated to cost about 
€900bn over the period 1996-2020; while the total cost of the  30 Priority 
Projects was €415bn. Assuming the estimate as a valid reference value, 
Table 3 shows the level of attainment expected by the end of 2013. Results 
in the 30 priority projects are expected to reach a level (0,67) lower than 
those in the comprehensive network (89%) even though funding and 
financing from the EU and EIB are going to be slightly more abundant in the 
former case (59% against 55%). This indicates that the scarce Community 
resources have actually been concentrated on the priority projects, while the 
remaining projects of the whole network have largely been left to national 
public and private resources (116% vis-à-vis 0,73).  
Table 3 - TEN-T Costs (€bn)  
  
1996-
2013 
1996-
2020 Ratio 
Comprehensive network 798 900 0,89 
EU and EIB 220 400 0,55 
Private sector 578 500 1,16 
Priority projects 280 415 0,67 
EU and EIB 95 162 0,59 
Private sector 185 253 0,73 
Elaborations on EC-DG TREN (2010) data source 
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Indeed, besides providing EU funds directly to major projects in the 
comprehensive network and in the priority links, the TENs and TEN-T 
initiatives aimed  to leverage  on national public funds and thus promote  
public funding overall for infrastructure investment. This strategy, however, 
seems to have not delivered as expected because the funding gap in 
infrastructure investment has remained  unchanged from one financial 
perspective to the next. Future prospects are by no means better. First of all, 
fiscal stabilization is bound to make the scarcity of public funds more severe 
than it is now. Unlike China, India and also the United States, which tackled 
the credit crisis by increasing infrastructure spending considerably, the EU 
and the Member Countries have not inflated public expenditure in 
infrastructure. Secondly, global capital markets are expected to invert the 
past trend and make real long-term interest rates increase in relation to the 
on- going surge in infrastructure investment and the contraction of saving in 
emerging economies. This means Europe must learn to face intensified 
competition for equity and finance capital from the emerging economies.  
 
 
4. Infrastructure, public investment and growth 
Economic growth cannot be sustained without adequate net fixed capital 
formation. The expansion of economic infrastructure capital in transport, 
communications and in the different utilities is surely a necessary condition 
for economic growth. The same is largely true for social capital (hospitals, 
schools, etc.), but economic growth also critically depends on countless 
mobile capital goods, i.e. equipment— software included— and other 
intangible capital goods. As is obvious, in any knowledge-based economy, 
innovation contributes to growth if it lets productive knowledge accumulate 
in the system. It is for the same reason that depreciation allowances, which 
are basically made to compensate for the consumption of capital goods, can 
contribute to growth if they make it possible to exploit technical progress. 
With the exclusion of changes in inventories and new residential real estate, 
therefore, basically all gross fixed tangible and intangible capital formation 
contributes to per capita GDP growth. Mature and emerging economies, 
nevertheless, behave differently.   
The stock of capital to output ratio has the property of being rather 
uniform across countries as it ranges between 2 and 3, whatever the level of 
their per capita GDP (e.g. McKinsey, 2010). This means that to increase per 
capita GDP any country must keep the GDP rate of growth g  and the stock 
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rate of growth 11 −= −tt KKβ in balance: g≈β . At the same time there is 
statistical evidence showing that the capital/output ratio tt yK  increases 
with respect to the investment rate tt yI /  (e.g. Jones, 2008) although the 
investment rate is neither stable over time nor across countries. Indeed, to 
get an additional percentage point of GDP, a country needs not make a fixed 
amount of gross investment each year. In this regard mature economies and 
emerging economies behave differently. Even for extended periods of time, 
mature economies decrease their rate of investment as if they preferred to 
grow by increasing internal consumption rather than investment, and 
particularly infrastructure investment. In these  economies the capital-output 
ratio is already high and the labour force barely grows, thus making 
opportunities for private investors less abundant. The equation 
tttt yKgyI 1)( −+= δ § shows that a low rate of output growth and 
sluggish maintenance keep the investment rate low, at the given 
capital/output ratio. Emerging economies do just the opposite as they 
typically take off by increasing exports and investment to accelerate the 
growth in domestic consumption only later on. To increase per capita GDP, 
the emerging economies need to increase the rate of investment and During 
the recent crisis they have further raised the investment rate and seem 
determined to continue to do so. Unfortunately, in order to increase 
consumption they are expected to reduce the supply of saving (McKinsey, 
2010). These tendencies will surely weigh on the demand and supply of 
saving at the global scale  and are predicted to make the cost of capital 
higher in real terms**.  
Since infrastructure investments are a powerful anti-cyclical demand 
factor, some countries have not failed to take stock of this property to 
counter the slump in demand in 2008 and 2009 with suitable fiscal stimuli. 
China and India, but also the United States, have tackled the  slump by 
increasing infrastructure spending considerably. China, in particular,  
                                                           
§
 The equation tttt yKgyI 1)( −+= δ  where ty is the GDP and δ  is the 
required rate of maintenance investment, is easily derived from the definition 
ttt KKI =−+ −1)1( δ  and from the assumption g≈β .    
**
 This helps to preserve dynamic efficiency in the economy, i.e. a return rate on 
capital higher than the growth rate. 
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introduced a substantial fiscal stimulus in 2008 ($500bn) devoting a large 
portion to infrastructure, especially railways and China is currently held to 
have the largest HSR network and to have planned to nearly triple it to more 
than 16.000km over the next decade. This will be made possible by a steady 
public investment flow as the largest contribution to infrastructure 
investment and by an increasing amount of bank loans. Indeed, if the 
celebrated Keynesian effect of deficit spending really exists, this is surely 
the case of infrastructure. In the effort to counter a slump in real demand 
through the provision of low-return new infrastructure capital, the role of 
government is of key importance because the private sector − while being 
able to increase high-return non-infrastructure investment − has no incentive 
to make low-return infrastructure investment. The combination of low-return 
public investment in social infrastructure and high-return private investment 
can have the biggest impact on both demand and overall competitiveness. 
Since it is public investment that has such a strategic role, public expenditure 
in infrastructure investment should merit  special treatment in budget policy 
(see Section 7) in the EU and the Member Countries. From the point of view 
of the financial cost of infrastructure investment, China and the other big 
infrastructure spenders have certainly made a clever choice in exploiting the 
low level of long-term real interest rates  in the capital market during the last 
two decades.   
     
5. Funding, financing and real interest rates 
Low real capital costs have formed the backdrop to investors’ decisions 
for at least the last twenty years all over the world. Real long-term interest 
rates started falling substantially from their peak in the early 1980s, but they 
became low by historical standards during the 1990s, and dipped further 
during the global financial crisis (Martellato, 2010). The descending trend in 
real interest rates has been ascribed not only to the gradual fading out of the 
effects of past inflation on nominal interest rates, an effect which dates back 
to the 1980s, but also to the excess of saving over investment at the global 
level which emerged later on.  Bernanke (2005) famously defined this 
secular trend the “saving glut”. It is natural to think that the two forces of 
inflation expectations under the present conditions of extraordinary loose 
monetary policy and heightened infrastructure investment in emerging 
economies could make real long-term interest rates go into reverse and start 
increasing again.  
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The briefly described scenario has certainly created a potentially 
favorable environment for long-term investment during the past decade at 
least, but it was not able to avoid the lowering investment rate in mature 
economies, the EU included. As a result, a large amount of capital is 
currently required at global level to recover the historical ratio between 
capital and output in the mature economies and to bring emerging economies 
to the same level. Investment projects in the EU have to compete with 
similar projects in mature economies to fund or finance the investment with 
the resources available in the global capital markets. This means that the 
difficulties encountered so far in funding and financing TENs with private 
resources are probably bound to increase in the coming years. 
A further obstacle is the uneven creditworthiness of national 
governments in the EU. The euro crisis in 2010 and the ensuing decision to 
recover austerity in the national budgets under the Stability Growth Pact are 
leading to a reduction in government infrastructure spending. The reduction 
is obviously extremely dangerous for those countries where the 
accumulation of economic capital has been limited in the past. Indeed, 
prolonged underinvestment in infrastructure amid accelerated investment in 
competitor countries will feed negatively back on private investment in the 
same countries and will inevitably end up by making permanent the current 
gap in labour  productivity, output and employment growth. Therefore, if the 
low creditworthiness reflects doubts about debt sustainability, low 
creditworthiness will end up feeding back on itself through low capital 
formation.  
The  sudden and rapid increases in bond spreads observed in May and 
November 2010 inside in the EU-EMU clearly reveal that in some countries 
public debt is perceived as risky. It does not matter if the State is directly 
issuing bonds or simply giving guarantees to the agency in charge of running 
the project. The real interest rate paid on bonds can go higher when the State 
becomes less creditworthy even if the international risk-free interest rate gets 
lower. Thus the highly indebted European countries face risks which are 
particularly high. 
The first victim of the 2008-2209 credit crisis was obviously bank 
financing, which made regular project financing and private-public 
partnerships lose ground. Capital constraints together with the reduced 
willingness of banks to extend credit in large amounts and for longer 
maturities will continue to make the financing of larger infrastructure 
projects particularly challenging. The combination of low profitability and 
high project costs is obviously impairing the possibility of some projects to 
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have access to long-term financing. In reviewing the various strategic 
possibilities of financing the TEN-T  (EIB, 2009) a working group 
consisting of  DG TREN and DG  ECFIN and  EIB representatives observed 
that PPP programmes should be enhanced; but also that the difficult market 
conditions squeeze traditional sources of senior debt thus constraining such 
programmes. This forced the governments in the countries where large 
projects are under way to provide new emergency guarantee/lending 
facilities in 2009. As is obvious, since TENT-T is a long-term endeavour 
requiring long-term finance that bank credit can no longer provide, capital 
market access has to be improved.  
The capital market could provide finance in various ways. Infrastructure 
bonds are one old†† and obvious possibility which could be particularly 
interesting if the EU, instead of national States, decided to directly issue 
euro-denominated debentures. This would create a new integrated bond 
market larger and more liquid than any other existing national market for 
bond-denominated national bonds. Unfortunately, this idea has never 
received sufficient political support in the European Council and the absence 
of an integrated bond market is thus making the full realization of the 
European network a difficult task under the current conditions of tight credit.  
Other forms of financing are possible. Specialized loans/instruments as an 
alternative to standard EIB loans have already been used by the EIB (EIB, 
2009). Listed infrastructure stocks are traded on the open market and require 
that the project capability to offer an attractive return. Existing infrastructure 
stocks in Europe and all other continents include business such as toll roads, 
airports, port operators, energy and utilities that are long-term assets based 
on monopolistic positions in markets where demand is high. They form a 
distinct global asset class which is credited with a low correlation with other 
asset classes and their specific index (e.g. S&P, 2009). Infrastructure funds 
are typically open to institutional investors. The 2020 European Fund for 
Energy, Climate Change and Infrastructure, also known as the Marguerite 
Fund, was established in 2009 to reach €1.5bn in 2011. It is sponsored by the 
EIB and another five national institutions from France, Italy, Germany, 
Spain and Poland. It is expected to be a model of risk-sharing for other 
public and private funds.    
                                                           
††
 Italy issued infrastructure bonds in 1963. The EC  suggested it  in the White Paper 
on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment (1993).     
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6.  Profitability of infrastructure investment 
Six expert groups were appointed to support the EC in addressing the 
funding and financing issue because the implementation of the vast majority 
of the TENT-T project has always been critically dependent on public funds. 
While the cost of capital has not been a major obstacle to the TENs and 
TEN-T, at least so far, the low profitability of many TEN-T projects has 
certainly deterred private investors from taking part in them, thus making 
their implementation totally dependent on public funding. The single 
projects cannot be appraised solely in financial terms because many benefits 
− typically those of reduced environmental costs − cannot be recouped in the 
form of fare revenue. In a purely financial appraisal, some projects would 
then be left out; while in a full cost-benefit analysis they would probably not 
be if the economic rate of return resulting from a cost-benefit analysis were 
higher than the financial rate of return. This is the case of rail projects in 
general and, in particular, of the cross-border links that are  vital for the 
operability of the network and thus for the EU as such. Rail projects are 
coherently held to merit priority inside the Commission.  
TEN-T is at best the aggregation of transport corridors rather than a 
network (EC, 2010b), but current rail priority projects envisage an HSR 
network whose hub is centered on Paris with spokes going towards London, 
Amsterdam, Frankfurt, Metz and Lyon-Marseilles. The subsystems in Spain, 
Italy and Germany are still largely disconnected from the core and in some 
cases peripheral. The basic economic motivation for building HSR 
infrastructure is the existence of a commercial demand for high speed 
connection and a gap in the capacity. However, in many instances, the 
willingness to pay for HSR service is certainly not sufficient to cover 
construction, maintenance and operating costs, which are variable and often 
very high‡‡, nor is it clear whether social benefits are able to compensate for 
those costs everywhere.  
The motivation, therefore, cannot be found either on purely financial or 
economic grounds. It probably lies in the will of the national rail companies 
to compete with air and car transport to regain lost market share, and in the 
                                                           
‡‡
 De Rus – Nash (2007) demonstrated why HSR infrastructure should be justified 
on the basis of number of travellers and their willingness to pay on a single link.  
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interest of the largest national companies to develop a proprietary HSR 
technology. Subsidiary to this is the strategic choice of the EU to create a 
protected market large enough to allow European manufacturers to maintain 
and possibly foster their competitive edge in HSR technology. Operators, 
who often run both tracks and services on many links, seek to use innovation 
strategically. To gain market share in the global HSR market they need to 
gain and retain control in the domestic market and to use it to promote their 
own technology. Indeed, large integrated European companies such as SNCF 
(and affiliates) and DB increasingly compete with their own individual HSR 
technologies (TGV, Eurostar, ICE, TAV, etc.) for the service on the tracks of 
the European network, where patronage is highest, and also with Canadian, 
Japanese and, more recently, Chinese competitors to gain market penetration 
in the networks that are fast growing in large economies such as China 
(Wright, 2010).     
 
7. Fiscal consolidation and public investment 
The 2008-9 credit crisis forced European governments to raise the 
average budget deficit in the euro area from 2% to 6.3% and the average 
debt to GDP ratio from 69.4% to 78.7% in 2009 (Eurostat, 2010). The 
worsening, which by no means reflects efforts to increase infrastructure 
investment, has made debt spreads widen dramatically, impairing the ability 
of peripheral countries to face debt obligations. The initial deterioration and 
the ensuing worsening of market conditions, therefore, have severely 
reduced the capacity of governments to invest in infrastructure either with 
public resources such as tax revenues and debt finance. The reaction of the 
EU to the crisis in 2010 consisted in the introduction firstly of a temporary 
rescue scheme (the EFSF until 2013) and subsequently with a permanent 
rescue scheme (EMS since 2013). Such schemes imply loans to the country 
hit by a surge in debt spreads (as was the case of Greece and Ireland in 
2010). A further decision was about strengthening the Stability and Growth 
pact, i.e. the surveillance mechanism on the budget and debt position of the 
Member Countries. The ECB itself started intervening in specific segments 
of the bond market (Greece, Ireland, Portugal in 2010). There is, therefore, a 
danger that a tough and prolonged fiscal consolidation would end up 
worsening the traditional bias against net investment and particularly 
infrastructure investment everywhere in Europe. 
  To eliminate this bias, the so-called golden rule in fiscal policy has 
been advocated at least from the early years of adoption of the SGP (e.g. 
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Blanchard, 2004). According to this rule, the public budget does not impose 
a burden on future generations if public current spending is paired by current 
receipts. Net investment, therefore, could be financed by raising debt. To 
make government pursue the golden rule, the SGP should then keep the 
current budget separate from the capital budget and penalize only a current 
budget deficit. Thus a government should be asked to keep current expenses 
(depreciation allowances and interest payment included) balanced with 
current receipts, at least on average along the cycle§§ and allowed to finance 
only net investment.. The goal pursued with this budget rule is to avoid 
mounting pressure on public debt reduction ending up  worsening the 
underinvestment trend observed in the European countries in the last 
decades. The positive effect of this rule could be increased if the debt were 
issued by the EU directly or by the Member Countries under the guarantee 
offered by the EU in order to limit its effects on the spreads.   
 
8. The governance issue  
Central and local governments often have different agendas and the two 
do not necessarily match. In all democratic systems, therefore, a balance 
between the instances of the different levels of government  must be found to 
reach the common good. When governance is not up to the needs, such a 
result is lacking and projects are destined to flounder, caught in a web of 
overlapping central and local competencies. Also citizens have their own 
preferences and usually only some of them benefit while others lose from 
infrastructure building, particularly in the case of HSR. Equity, therefore, 
calls for  some form of compensation, which in turn requires determining 
whether the willingness to pay of the beneficiaries really exceeds the 
compensation due to the losers. Specific procedures and mechanisms such as 
the enquête publique and the débat publique in France and the public inquiry 
in Britain have been devised to find equilibrium. 
Italy is a case of unclear and not shared division of responsibilities over 
the location of infrastructure. On one side, there is a potential increase in the 
role of local administrations over development strategy and policy as shown 
by the institutions of ordinary regions (1970), non-ordinary regions and 
                                                           
§§
 Current expenditure must be lower than current receipts if the debt has to be 
reduced 
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autonomous provinces (1972) and,  lately, fiscal federalism. On the other 
side, there is the will to increase the role of the central government as 
regards major infrastructures. The Target Bill*** (2001) was purposely 
introduced to promote strategic infrastructures by shifting the balance from 
local to central government and by increasing the role of private capital. Its 
very existence demonstrates that governance is a big issue in Italy. So far, 
the bill has not been able to increase funding and financing adequately and 
speed up planning and implementation (Signorini, 2009).  Governance is a 
common problem and is a further hurdle to progress in the TEN-T. There is 
no general rule or paradigm since each country has its own governance, but 
the EC through the Expert Group 1 has recently tried to fix ideas about 
objectives and methodologies in transport network planning (EC Expert 
Group 1, 2010) to be used in the different political contexts 
 
9. Summary and  conclusions 
The realization of a single multimodal transport network (TEN-T) as a 
part of Trans European networks (TENs) is the translation of the 
infrastructure policy envisaged in the Maastricht Treaty (1992). Together 
with the single currency, these networks were intended to deepen internal 
integration and thus to derive full benefit from the single market and the 
single currency. HSR and modern transport management systems, which 
absorb the larger part of available resources, aim to qualitatively improve 
infrastructure capital and also to permit the biggest European integrated 
transport companies and  manufacturers to use their control on the domestic 
                                                           
***
 The Target Bill (Legge Obiettivo) is backed by the Public Contract Code (Codice 
dei contratti pubblici, 2006) and a number of special execution procedures. It failed 
to indicate priorities and did not indicate any  useful criteria for  identifying them in 
the long list of projects.  While diminishing the role of local authorities and 
Communities, the Target Bill gives the biggest role to the Treasury and the 
Transport and Infrastructure Ministry (CIPE). A parallel initiative was the 
introduction of the Emergence Decree (Decreto sulle Emergenze, 2008) giving large 
resources and a major role to the Civil Protection Department, that is to the Head 
of government, in matters such as major emergencies and major events. The 
government, however, failed to find approval for the bill transforming the 
Department into a limited liability private company.  
  
16 
market to improve  technology and thus to compete in the global market 
more effectively. From a purely macroeconomic point of view, infrastructure 
investment and public capital also represent an effort to make the stock of 
capital increase faster than GDP, i.e. to reverse the downtrend in investment-
to-GDP which is a typical feature of mature economies. From the same point 
of view, infrastructure investment has failed to be used as an instrument to 
counter a slump in real demand. 
Good reasons to promote infrastructure investment are not in short 
supply. Nevertheless, the EU, the national governments and the private 
investors, although for different reasons, have not been able to cooperate to 
make TEN-T and, in particular, Priority Projects progress as hoped, at least 
so far. The funding gap has always been and remains the most evident 
obstacle to the actual full implementation of TEN-T. There is evidence that 
EU enlargement has compounded the effects of deepening internal 
integration on the demand of infrastructure capital. The saving glut of the 
past and the related low average level of long-term real interest rates created 
a very favourable scenario during the past twenty years, but have not been 
able to match the increase in the demand for infrastructure capital implied by 
TEN-T with an increase of funds. These favourable conditions are predicted 
to weaken considerably in the coming years. Also the fiscal rules of the 
European monetary union and the ongoing fiscal consolidation are deemed 
to reduce the ability of governments to fund infrastructure investment, 
although the golden rule of fiscal policy offers the possibility to avoid this 
hurdle. These are by no means the sole obstacles to the completion of TEN-
T. The credit crunch, the technical difficulties of some specific links, the low 
profitability of many projects and the governance issue are other problematic 
aspects touched on in the paper.  
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